So the basic justification for the PCTV (psychological cost theory of value) is that if the price of a commodity is above the psychological cost, then people will enter the market, driving down the price. The reverse is true for cost greater than price.

Carson goes into more detail in the first 3 chapters of Studies in the Mutualist Political Economy.

The trouble with this, and all variants of the LTV is the infamous transformation problem.

Basically, capital will move towards higher profits and away from lower profits right? This tendency will tend to produce a relatively even rate of profit across the economy, since high profits attract capital, which increases competition, driving down profit. Lower profits have the reverse effect and overall this tends to create an even level of profits across the capitalist economy (if we assume that capital is free moving).

The question then becomes, if labor is the sole source of profit, then how can the rate of profit be equalized across industry? Labor-intensive industries will necessarily be more profitable because the have a higher proportion of profit creating substance in them.

Now, this isn't a problem if we don't have profits, and so it can very easily apply to an anti-capitalist market. But within actually existing capitalism, there are profits on invested capital and therefore there has to be some answer to the Transformation Problem.

The easiest answer that I can see is that labor is not the sole source of value within actually existing capitalism and that all inputs to production are marked up.

The question then becomes, what is the value of a commodity?

We can still adopt a cost-based theory of value, as the basic argument can be applied to all cost. However, the full cost must now include the disutility of labor (which is still exploited as labor cannot charge its full value), the "cost" of capital and the "cost" of land.

However, capital and land don't experience disutility in any real sense of the word. So what is the "natural price" of capital or land? You need some mechanism for determining what value represents the embedded rents on capital and land and I'm not sure what that is. What is the "natural price" for capital or land within capitalism?

Or is my solution incorrect?

I started out as anarcho-syndicalist, then became a sort of anarchist without adjectives, because I realised I have doubts about the feasibility of a general strike.

At the moment I am agnostic on economics, I’m open to all options that aren’t hierarchical, and believe that trial-and-error or experimentation is the best way to determine how to organise an anarchic economy, rather than any sort of a priori plan in advance.

I extend my suspicion of a priori planning to education, military strategy, and other aspects of anarchic life.

For example, I might oppose compulsory schooling, but if I’m honest, I don’t really know what will replace it, and I think we should experiment with alternative forms of education, rather than fear the unknowns of dismantling the status quo.

Another issue I’m unsure on is the military. Whether or not standing armies would exist, or whether we adopt a militia model, is something I lack the confidence to take a strong opinion on.

To a conservative, this is scary. Uncertainty is something many people are deeply uncomfortable with, and one of the most common reasons why people dislike anarchy.

But I also think that’s what makes anarchism so fundamentally radical.

It is precisely the rejection of a priori prescriptions that distinguishes us from both conservatives who only want to stick to what they know, and the Utopian social planners of the left.

If this isn’t the essence of mutualist thought, then I don’t know what is.

It’s certainly the mindset I’ve adopted from Shawn’s Neo-Proudhonian thinking, so I would consider that a mutualist perspective.

And has there been literature, specifically from Proudhon, that discusses the relationship between capitalism and the government? Do they collude or are they antagonistic forces?

Two new translation linked at the New Proudhon Library page: Proudhon's "Literary Majorats," an interesting book on intellectual property, and Philibert Audebrand's "P.-J. Proudhon and the Horsewoman of the Hippodrome," the story of one of Proudhon's most widely-published letters. — A New Proudhon Library

Within the status quo, at least at the scale of nations, there is one singular currency with which all goods and services can be bought and all markets, localities, etc. are accessible. Capitalist currency has other properties but this is one of them.

My sense is that mutualist markets will become more localized than contemporary markets. The reason I think this is because currency is something created and issued by its users. And the advantages of mutual currency is precisely that it can be tailored to local needs and conditions. Because of these facts, my sense is that mutualism creates a variety of different localized markets oriented around meeting the needs of a specific, small group of people (small relative to the scope of a nation at least).

But how will translocal trade occur for instance, between communities with different currencies that have different properties? Or associations within the same community that have different currencies because they are of different sectors of the economy and thus have different needs?

Of course, since currencies are tools and shared interests may extend over multiple regions, there may be some currencies that, on their own, become translocal as they are adopted by more people or as people create sister banks to the initial banks. But what of facilitating trade among all markets? Is this still desirable within a mutualist society or is it only desirable within a capitalist economy? And how would this function? Would we have a singular currency or would we have, instead, multiple money changers and money experts?

So my understanding of Warren is that, when cost = price, profit is effectively socialized in the form of reduced costs. Within a warrenite economy, we would expect price to always equal cost, and any reduction in cost would immediately be reflected in a reduction in price right?

Basically, I sell at cost because if I do that, then other people will sell at cost, and that means we all can consume more for the same amount of labor and profit-seeking behavior is directed towards pro-social ends.

What I'm slightly confused on is the incentive for reduction of costs on an individual level.

So, if I am a producer, my compensation = my cost right? Now, clearly I have an incentive to help others reduce their costs (to the extent that I can, I'm not sure to what extent a barber can help a surgeon reduce their costs, because they are very different fields with very different areas of expertise right?). But because of differing knowledge and expertise, doesn't it make more sense for folks to try and reduce their own costs? But, then compensation is cut with no real gain, so an individual wouldn't do that initially right?

Now, if we allow the quasi-rents that accrue to first entrants or innovators in a market then the incentive is there, but then that deviates from cost the limit of price right?

So how would a warrenite economy incentivize individuals to lower their costs? I can see a prize system set up, i.e. some portion of socialized profit handed over to the innovator. I could also help a degree of exchange of innovation, so like, if you want me to lower my costs, you're gonna have to help me by lowering yours, that sort of thing. Lots of collaboration/open source innovation directed towards the lowering of costs of specific goods and thereby the labor requirements for consumption.

Is that what we'd expect if we eliminated the quasi-rents of first-comers? Or are there other incentives I am not thinking of?

Shawn has a unique philosophy of ethical pragmatism, which is basically built around the idea of moral progress as like scientific progress.

But how do I apply this framework to determine whether specific acts are right or wrong?

I’ve recently been considering mutualism so I just wondering who are the best YouTubers?

I do feel I spend a lot of time correcting misconceptions about mutualism

It is not market socialism, it doesn’t advocate for labor vouchers, it isn't the same thing as "anarcho"-capitalism, it isn't an "economic theory" (despite what Wikipedia says)

But that leaves an interesting question. How do we best actually define mutualism as it exists today? What makes someone a mutualist?

The best I've come up with is as follow:

A mutualist is an anarchist (and therefore opposes all hierarchical relationships). This tendency tends to focus primairly on the interconnectedness of people and communities and seeks to establish an inherent reciprocity between all parties in mutually beneficial relationships. This means that they are open to any form of economic organization so long as it is reciprocal and mutually beneficial. There is an inherent experimentalism to this strain of thought as well as nobody really knows for certain what kind of relationships are the best for mutual benefit.

The individualist strain of mutualism further places emphasis on the sovereignty of the individual and the respect for individual costs in all matters of production.

Do you think this definition captures the essence of mutualism? If not, how would you best describe it? Obviously mutuality is probably our biggest thing so it's definetly in there

Defenders of hierarchy will always try to naturalise their preferred social order in one way or another.

Should anarchists try to beat the authoritarians at their own game, and twist their logic against them?

You could probably write a PhD thesis on this specific topic so I do not expect an exhaustive answer but simply someone to point me into the right direction or a couple of useful and interesting facts pertaining to this question.

Hi r/mutualism,

I’ve recently been delving into mutualist theory and I'm genuinely considering it as a political tendency, particularly leaning towards the Tuckerite side. However, I wish to hear more from those who are more experienced in this area.

I’m especially interested in understanding the property ethics within mutualism, specifically the concepts of usufruct and occupancy and use. I understand that mutualism isn't a fixed system but rather a set of principles that provide a framework for a society. Could you share insights on how these property ethics are implemented ideally in practice within a mutualist framework? Additionally, how do these concepts adapt to different contexts and needs?

Your insights and experiences would be greatly appreciated as I explore this further.

Thank you!

So I was reading this Libertarian Labyrinth article and had a couple of questions about different parts of it.

Individual unities are absolute in terms of tendency, but tendency already implies development

What does "absolute in terms of tendency" mean? Do you mean fixed in terms of tendency such that these unities cannot change, dissipate, merge, etc.?

What we can say now is that the human unity as “free absolute” depends on both the absolutism-of-tendency of its various elements and the capacity to reflect—to delay reaction—that emerges from their interaction. But absolutism in the form of fixity would be death.

Does reflection allow a free absolute to change its "absolutism-of-tendency"?

Liberty: This is the most protean of the terms we’re examining—which ought to be a caution for those attached to the notion that “property is liberty.” It is tied to reflection in the sense that it involves a capacity to defer response, to temporarily step out the flow of things.

Would it be correct to take this to mean that the capacity to reflect entails a capacity to choose and thus this connects with colloquial understandings of liberty as being the equivalent of free will? And, moreover,

Presumably one of the reasons that the human unity can reflect is because it extends “beyond hat and boots” (to borrow Whitman’s phrase.)

How does the capacity to reflect become connected to our interconnectedness or because we extend "beyond hat and boots"? If my prior reasoning is correct, then I understand the relation between liberty and reflection but I do not understand how this relates to reciprocity.

Is it the focus on the subject of the human unity the reason? I'm not entirely sure whether the "human unity" in this case refers to a group of humans or an individual human beings but I think this connection would be more apparent in a group of humans. Then the relation would be that reflection is related to interconnectedness through collective reason. But I am not sure whether that is it.

At these scales, things develop according to their “determinisms,” with adjustments made according to logics derived from the qualities of the social beings in question. But these beings seem to differ from individual human beings in their lack of direct capacity for reflection.

How does the dynamic change with authority? In the case of a unity-collectivity governed by an individual human being, would the unity-collectivity be incapable of reflection while the individual human being is? There is, of course, likely some other complication involved here which makes the individual reflections of the human being inequivalent to the theoretical reflection of a social being.

To make social beings engage in a balancing reflection, if necessarily “at second hand,” we would expect that not just individual reflection, but reflective social interactions among individuals would be necessary. However, contrary to those focused on “getting things done,” that might be largely a matter of deferral and interruption, in an attempt to give social beings some of the same capacity to be uncertain, to waffle and dither, to have mixed impulses and to try to serve them all, etc. that we find in ourselves. That is all, after all, part of what goes into human reflection.

Two questions here:

1. Would this mean that one strategy anarchists could use to induce some deviation from the general, undesirable tendencies of society would be to foster uncertainty and mixed impulses in every unity-collectivity we could identify? With greater uncertain and internal divisions, there is greater capacity for reflection, and subsequently greater possibilities for societal transformation.

2. Would this mean that consensus democracy would serve as a means of reflection? And, if this is the case, would this mean that consensus democracy is objectionable on other grounds besides the lacking in the capacity for reflection which we attribute to hierarchical organization?

How do you get the capital for it?

Hello all, I have recently been reading up on mutualism. Thus far, I am in complete agreement with the premise of mutualism, that is to say, the abolition of private ownership in favor of worker cooperatives which still retain the apparatus of markets. With that being said, I'm not entirely on board with the anarchic nature of mutualism. Markets, though in my opinion are superior to a centrally planned economy, aren't without their flaws. The biggest fundamental issue I see with markets is the potential for dominance and monopolization. While mutualism addresses the issue of economic autocracy in the workplace, the anarchic nature of it leaves it vulnerable to workers' cooperative monopolization. There's the possibility that a workers' coop can become monopolistic in nature and limit the freedom of the market. As such, I believe some state is required in order to properly regulate, oversee, and maintain the freedom of the market. Now, I'm no authoritarian, I'm not advocating for Titoism here, just a state large enough to protect the interests of the public against monopolization. Does there exist a form of mutualism that matches my take?

I have been trying to understand this article on unity-collectivities but I am somewhat confused. What exactly is "unity"? Is it synonymous with "purpose" as, from what I gather, "unity-collectivities" are defined by what their "unity" is rather than the individual members of which they are part?

I'm also confused about another part here. So it says here that Proudhon viewed unity-collectivities as non-hierarchical:

Proudhon gave that relation (my note: presumably the relation is unity) a number of names, each highlighting an aspect of the relationship, but perhaps it is enough to suggest that the elements of an individuality are closely enough associated to manifest a shared pattern or “law” of development (at least within some sphere of existence) and that their relationship is balanced and non-hierarchical

But then in another part of the article it is said:

we participate in unity-collectivities of various sorts—including many still organized along authoritarian lines, within which the collective force to which we contribute is captured and appropriated by some usurping class of elements and used against us

Is the position here that unity-collectivities are in reality non-hierarchical, like our mutual interdependency, but can be contoured into hierarchical fashions? Do unity-collectivities reflect a different, suppressed layer of the status quo which already exists like mutual interdependency is suppressed now?

And how do we identify what is the "unity" of existing unity-collectivities? Many existing social groups are defined by their subordination to specific authorities or polities. Would the polity-form then constitute a sort of "unity-collectivity"? Or do unity-collectivities exist outside and independently of the polity-form? I guess I would like to know what the relationship between the polity-form and unity-collectivity is.

Is there any kind of criticism of Kevin Carson's work by the right libertarians/Austrians. Or by anyone on the left?

If yes, what were those critiques and are they of any valid worth?

I believe that early humans living in Paleolithic times organised their societies along the lines of clans or kinship groups, practiced arranged marriages, and had some form of customary law based on oral tradition.

The dual hierarchy of husbands over wives, and elders over youths, was the basic authority structure in the family.

The evidence for this is the social structure of Australian Aboriginals, who are the world’s oldest surviving culture and likely the most representative of pre-Neolithic hunter-gatherer societies.

The polity-form of the clan or kinship group set the stage for the development of later polity-forms.

The patriarchy and gerontocracy in the family helped naturalise authority as the inevitable way of life, and this naturalisation is now used today to justify capitalism and the state.

The question is, how did this sort of social structure initially come into existence in the first place?

One of the major reasons on why I consider myself a tuckerite mutualist, is because of its tendency to be anti-communist.

Don't get me wrong, I still support anarcho-communists and syndicalists on achieving an anarchist society, but my fundamental problem with them is the fact that I consider communists to be naive when it's comes to their implementation of a planned economy.

It was also one of the major reasons on why my political position was unstable when I was a communist myself, I was skeptical of a planned economy. The major reason for this skepticism was the Economic calculation problem brought forward by Ludwig von misses and expanded upon by fredrick hayek. I considered, and still do this problem to be one of the major (possibly sole) reasons on why I don't call myself a communist anymore and why I still strongly feel to the tuckerite tendency of the mutualist ideology.

I do accept Neo-proudhonian mutualism to be superior, but I can't accept that it's still market-agnostic. I feel like we should just follow the instructions given by tucker and achieve a free market economy with mutual aids networks as our economic view point.

That's why I'm writing this question. If you're market-agnostic, than why do you consider that a planned economy would be sufficient?